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Abstract
The aim of this investigation is to show how the use of classroom experiments
may be a good pedagogical tool to teach the Nash equilibrium (NE) concept.
For our purposes, the basic game is a repeated version of the Beauty Contest
Game (BCG), a simple guessing game in which repetition lets students react
to other players’ choices and converge iteratively to the equilibrium solution.
We perform this experiment with undergraduate students with no previous
training in game theory. After four rounds, we observe a clear decreasing
tendency in the average submitted number in all groups. Thus, our findings
prove that by playing a repeated BCG, students quickly learn how to reach
the NE solution.
Keywords: Classroom Experiments — Beauty Contest Game — Teach-
ing — Nash Equilibrium
J.E.L. Classification: A22, C99, D83
Reasons for this study
In recent years, Game Theory (GT) has become an essential part of interme-
diate microeconomics theory. Obviously, the key concept in Game Theory is
the Nash Equilibrium (NE), making this powerful notion an inevitable part
of our teaching. Educators, however, know that it is not an easy task to
explain the NE in class. Students usually find difficulties in understanding
the idea behind it and, consequently, the implicit features of this concept.
Generally, the teaching of GT begins with the study of strategic inter-
actions among players considering only pure strategies. Once players un-
derstand that each player’s payoffs depend not only on their own actions
but also on those of other players, the next step is to explain the process
of elimination of dominated strategies. To do this, only two basic assump-
tions are required: rationality (maximization) and common knowledge (of
rationality). Both concepts let us solve (dominance solvable) games and also
predict some particular behavior. However, there exist games that are not
dominance solvable even if they have a NE. In this case, the NE requires
an additional hypothesis: common knowledge of players’ beliefs about their
rivals’ actions. Hence, the best response becomes the suitable mechanism
for reaching the equilibrium solution. Best response is the best strategy that
a player may choose given the strategies chosen by his rivals. The NE is
reached when all agents play (some of) their best response. Thus, the NE
is self-enforcing because no player has incentives to deviate from it. Clearly,
the use of the NE eliminates circular reasoning (player 1 thinks that player
2 thinks that player 1 thinks . . . ) in games with at least one pure NE, not
in a game with a unique mixed NE.
This paper proposes a pedagogical tool for simplifying the teaching of the
NE: successive repetitions of a dominance solvable game, the Beauty Contest
Game (BCG). This particular game is very useful for showing, in an intuitive
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manner, the two procedures described above. Specifically, the game is played
four times in the form of a classroom experiment, prior to teaching a game
theory class.
In short, our findings clearly illustrate that students inexperienced in
GT apply both iterated elimination of dominated strategies and best-reply
behavior in each round to the previous choices. On average, we observe a
recursive approximation to the Nash prediction, which we call the learning
effect. Therefore, by repeating this static game, we ensure that students
learn how to solve it in some way or another.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Firstly, the theoretical
background of the basic Beauty Contest Game and its wide variety of ex-
perimental designs are presented in the next section. Our specific classroom
experiment is described in detail in the two following sections. In the post-
experimental session, we propose explaining the relevance of the Nash equi-
librium and dominance concepts to the students, relating them to their own
previous performance. We then analyze our findings and suggest some other
variations which could also be used as classroom BCG experiments. Finally,
conclusions are reached in the last section.
Theoretical Background
Since the introduction of the concept in Nash (1951), the Nash equilibrium
has not only become the standard tool for the economic scientific community,
but also the basis for the systematic teaching of the discipline in the modern
era.
In game theory, it is common practice to assume that individuals “mag-
ically” choose a set of actions such that all the (infinitively recursive) pre-
dictions come true. So as to reach this hard-to-believe solution, theorists
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can follow one of the two original Nash interpretations: either agents are
perfectly rational or there exists an evolutionary equilibrium1. As is well
known, the first interpretation relies on the assumption that all agents are
able to compute the game equilibria and reach one of them. In contrast, the
second interpretation presupposes the existence of a large population of ordi-
nary people that play the game in an evolutionary framework: that is, they
pick up one strategy randomly, if the outcome is good, they repeat it again
or if the strategy is bad, they will disappear. After some time, the game will
converge to one of the Nash equilibriums. The BCG is a good example of
the underlying convergence to both interpretations. From a rational point
of view, it is not credible that the subjects will solve this problem (few peo-
ple can at the first try!), but if it is repeated, the solution will converge to
equilibrium most of the time.
The Beauty Contest Game is a simple guessing game that makes it easy
to evaluate individuals’ level of reasoning. The basic BCG is as follows:
a certain number of subjects are invited to play a game in which all of
them must simultaneously choose a real number from an interval (generally
[0, 100]). The winner is the player who chooses the number that is closest to
p-times the mean of all the numbers chosen, where 1 > p > 0. The winner
receives a prize, the losers get nothing. Under these rules the unique Nash
equilibrium is zero for all players2. Other parameter configurations may
produce different or even multiple equilibria (see Bosch-Dome`nech et al.,
2002, for further details).
As Stahl (1996) points out the distribution of chosen numbers lets us
1For reasons of space, Nash only uses the rationality explanation in the published
version.
2This is not as obvious as it looks, Grosskopf and Nagel (2001) try a one-shot BGC
with game theorists. The answers were very different from zero, but better than the usual
ones!
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analyze the depth of reasoning of the agents, say, level 1 includes people
who expect that the other players behave randomly so they choose p ∗mean
(being mean = 50 if the choice distribution is uniform), level 2 contains
people expecting that the other’s depth of reasoning is level 1, and, choosing
then p2∗mean, . . . , generalizing, at level K are people who choose pK ∗mean
because they believe that the other people are at level K − 1. If K is big,
pK ∗mean ' 0, so if we repeat the process ad infinitum (K =∞) we reach
the theoretical solution, 0, the highest level of reasoning (figure 1 represents
this process with p = 2/3). Random answers are called level 0 of reasoning.
A level of reasoning higher than 3 is rare in BCG experiments (see Bosch-
Dome`nech et al., 2002), although this Iterated Best Replay Behavior (IBRB)
is quite commonly found (Ho et al., 1998).
[Figure 1 about here.]
Figure 2, taken from Ho et al. (1998, pg. 951), shows the convergence to
the zero theoretical solution from a dominance iterated point of view3. Given
p = 2/3, any number chosen between 66.6 and 100 is dominated by 66.6 =
100 ∗ 2/3. Hence the interval [66.6, 100] corresponds to irrational behavior
(what we call R(0)). Rational individuals will always choose a number in
the [0, 66.6] interval. Applying the same reasoning, R(1) players will choose
a number below 66.6, but above 44.4 = 2/3 ∗ 66.6, while R(2) players will
choose a number in the interval [29.6, 44.4]. Following this iterated reasoning
level process ad infinitum, we reach the unique Nash equilibrium (0, with
R(∞)). Thus, this game is called dominance solvable. In his book, Camerer
(2003, chapter 5) describes some other games that also tend to unravel and
would be fun to teach in class. These include the “patent race” game, in
which iteration eliminates some strategies but not others; centipede games,
3See Rapoport and Amaldoss (2000) for an experimental study of iterated elimination
of (strongly) dominated strategies.
4
price competition or traveler’s dilemma, in which the dominance reduces the
collective payoffs to players and the “dirty faces” game, in which an increase
in the number of steps of iterated deletion increases payoffs.
[Figure 2 about here.]
Nevertheless, this game makes a much more important point in practice:
if a subject plays the Nash equilibrium (0), in the majority of the cases he
will not win. Note that the key to this game is to take one more step of
deletion of dominated strategies than the other players (but not too many)4.
Hence, the NE is useful for knowing where the adaptive process leads, but it
is not a useful normative theory as a basis for advice5.
The original idea behind the BCG was first put forward by Keynes (1936)
to express that a clever investor has to “anticipate the basis of conventional
valuation a few months hence, rather than . . . over a long term of years”
(page 155), if he is to act in the stock market before other investors do.
The formal game model was later introduced by Moulin (1986). As we
noted above, the unique equilibrium of the game is 0 for p < 1 and is obtained
4Obviously, this process of reasoning involves knowing who you are playing with. In this
case, an individual who knows the zero-solution could also guess that most people will not
achieve the zero solution. Thus, clever individuals will be able to link their answer to their
estimation of the average rationality level. We call this rationality level ∞-plus (Keynes’
‘clever investor’). Bran˜as-Garza et al. (2001) report some examples of ∞-plus behavior
arising from internet BCG experiments. Bosch-Dome`nech et al. (2002, pg. 1693) found
strong evidence of this behavior, reporting some comments from students who followed this
strategy. Grosskopf and Nagel (2001) argue that most individuals think that other people
are not fully rational, thus explaining why the equilibrium is not reached immediately.
5This is one of the main advantages to using the BCG for teaching purposes. Nagel
(1999), using the same graph shown in Figure 2, illustrates how to explain iterated elimi-
nation of dominated strategies in a classroom setting.
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by iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies6.
After this basic framework was laid down, some experimental researchers
began to investigate BCG or “p-beauty” (see Ho et al., 1998). The first
experimental study can be found in Nagel (1994, 1995)7. Other studies have
been done by Bosch-Dome`nech et al. (2002); Bosch-Dome`nech and Nagel
(1997a,b); Duffy and Nagel (1997) and Ho et al. (1998). See also Nagel
(1998) for a survey of the literature.
A wide variety of BCG experimental designs can be found8. In these,
sometimes participants are students, at other times they are professors or
newspaper readers, some designs are one-shot, others are repeated, commu-
nication versus non-communication or laboratory versus field experiments.
Generally, BCG is run with individual subjects. Kocher and Sutter
(2001), however, compare individual versus group behavior in this type of
game. They find that although groups do not apply deeper levels of reason-
ing, they do, in fact, learn faster.
Repetition permits individuals to learn dynamically from other people’s
expected behavior. Our experiment is very similar to one in Ho et al.
(1998). In their design, individuals are given information about previous
period choices and, therefore, the learning process is based on an evolutive
game. In contrast, Weber (2003b) argues that learning with the BCG can
happen even without feedback. This author found that there was conver-
gence towards the NE in the game even when subjects did not receive any
information between periods.
Over the last years, research on the BCG has returned to Keynes’original
6It can also be obtained by using a best-response argument, see Nagel (1999).
7The main purpose of Nagel (1994, 1995) was to contrast an iterated best-reply domi-
nance model (IBRB).
8See Camerer et al. (2003b) for a list of 24 different BCG experiments.
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idea. Hirota and Sunder (2002) experimentally explore whether price bub-
bles in security markets are generated by a beauty-contest mechanism: if
dividends are paid beyond investors’ personal investment horizons, investors
must create beliefs about others’ beliefs (second-order beliefs) that depend
on third-order beliefs, which in turn depend on fourth-order beliefs, and so
on. They conclude that when the realization of the dividend is distant and
well beyond investors’ investment horizon, investors find it difficult to induce
the fundamental value of securities from the future to the present (backward
induction). This difficulty gives rise to price bubbles because, in this case,
investors adjust their expectations on the basis of observed prices (forward
induction).
Up to now, the BCG has primarily been used to study the depth of
individuals’ level of reasoning. However, in this paper we propose a new
application of this framework: classroom experiments with a pedagogical
aim9.
The experiment
The experiment involves using a repeated version of the Beauty Contest
Game with several groups of students to teach the Nash equilibrium; specif-
ically the iterated elimination of dominated strategies. Given that the Nash
equilibrium is a general topic in both intermediate microeconomics and in-
dustrial organization (and obviously in Game Theory, too), we expect this
pedagogical tool to be of great help to educators.
Three fundamental issues must be taken into account when running the
experiment:
9However, see also Nagel (1999) where she describes this application.
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1. The group should be large enough to reduce the effect of any one per-
son’s guess on the average. On the other hand, a very large group may
be too cumbersome for the instructor10.
Nagel (1995) uses 12 and 17 subjects in each group; Ho et al. (1998)
reduce the group size to 7 subjects and 3 subjects (like Kocher and Sut-
ter, 2001). Following these papers, we use small groups (5-6 subjects)
and large groups (10-11 subjects)11. Each group plays its own game in
which each subject plays a repeated BCG against the other members
of the group.
2. In order to motivate students, some type of reward should be given.
In our classroom experiment, the winner of each round was awarded
0.25 extra-credit points applicable towards the final exam. In the case
of several winners in the same round within the same group, the prize
was split among them.
Our experiment was performed in an Intermediate Microeconomics
Theory course during the spring semester of the 2002/2003 academic
year with three different groups: Business majors (morning and after-
noon groups, B-1 and B-2) and Business + Law majors (one single
group, B+L). All groups had an identical individual answer handout,
instructor and grading system (ranging from 0 to 10). Note that this
subject is a requisite in both majors.
3. Last of all, another important issue is the number of rounds that ex-
perimental subjects must play in the BCG. As our aim was for students
to learn the Nash equilibrium through the iterated elimination of dom-
10Ho et al. (1998) show that smaller groups (3 subjects in their research) need more
time to converge.
11It is difficult to have identically sized groups in a class. Usually, the instructor does
not have the exact number of students required.
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inated strategies, several rounds were needed to observe this learning
effect. Kocher and Sutter (2001) prove that 4 rounds are enough to
approximate the theoretical prediction.
The experiment lasts about one hour and the following post-experimental
session half an hour (note that it is worth running both sessions consecutively,
approximately 1.5 hours).
Procedures
1. The instructor has to define the size of each group. However, it is
irrelevant if one group differs slightly in size from the other groups.
Nevertheless, for purposes of comparison, it is desirable to have simi-
larly sized groups.
2. After determining group size, the instructor randomly selects one mon-
itor for each group from the student pool. Each monitor is awarded
0.25 points. The monitors’ task is to help the instructor to record and
monitor the experiment in his group. Each monitor is given a calcu-
lator and a monitoring sheet (see appendix). The monitor keeps track
of the individual choices in his group and calculates the mean and the
winning number. The monitoring sheets are crucial to explaining the
results after the experimental session as these findings will easily illus-
trate basic concepts of Game Theory, namely the iterated deletion of
dominated strategies.
3. The third task consists of creating groups, that is, students are ran-
domly assigned to different groups.
4. In order to make the monitor’s tasks easier, the instructor should seat
each group in a single row (or column).
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5. The instructor then gives the monitors their instructions and explains
the procedures to them. When this is done, the monitors hand out the
instruction sheets and the individual answer sheets to the experimental
subjects (see appendix).
6. The instructor must explain instructions out loud. It is important to
avoid numerical examples as the generation of focal points is immediate
in this kind of game. Any questions are answered aloud. Experimental
subjects are told that speaking is absolutely forbidden12.
7. When everyone fully understands the rules, the experiment can begin.
Round 1: Experimental subjects fill in their answer sheet. The monitor
then collects all guessed numbers and calculates the mean and 2/3 ∗
mean. By comparing this value to those reported by the experimental
subjects, the monitor determines the winner. The group is told the
mean, 2/3 ∗mean and the winner’s guess (but not who the winner is).
Nagel (1999) also gave the students the complete set of guesses 13.
8. Round 2: Following round 1, the students are informed that they will
play another round, independent of the previous one. The procedure
for round 2 is identical to round 1.
9. Round 3 and 4: Proceed as above.
12Subjects are required to keep a maximum level of confidentiality for their own sake.
Note that if any subject were to know his rival’s guess, he could use the best reply rule.
13In order to simplify the process, we did not give our students the entire set of numbers.
Nonetheless, the type of information provided in our experiment affected the convergence
speed: Weber (2003a,b) analyzes the effect of different feedback conditions on learning. He
found that convergence towards the equilibrium occurs under all circumstances, although
it is faster with feedback. See also the Variations section below.
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Post Experimental Discussion
Immediately following the experimental session, the post-experimental dis-
cussion is begun. In this second part of the experiment, the theoretical
background of the NE is introduced. This step involves three topics:
a. First, we present the iterated elimination of dominated strategies un-
derlying the BCG by means of Figure (2). By explaining this process,
students can understand that if rationality is common knowledge, no-
body will choose a number within the interval [66.6−100] because this
subset of numbers is dominated by [0− 66.6]. Following this reasoning
ad infinitum —as explained previously— students fully capture this
idea.
At this moment it is a good idea to show students the first round results
of the groups involved in the session. Alternatively, a simple histogram
of the pooled data may be used so as to cover up any embarrassing an-
swers (for more details, see the Results section). Students may compare
their own chosen numbers with those reported in Figure 2. Moreover,
it could be fun and interesting to show other experimental results so as
to offer students the opportunity to compare themselves to others (for
example, high school students, 80-year olds, corporate CEOs or even
game theorists). Nagel, 1999 and Camerer et al., 2003b report a high
number of BCG experiments with several contexts and subject pools14.
b. Once common knowledge rationality is clearly defined, it is time to
explain best response behavior. Students observe that their own per-
formance depends on their beliefs about other players’ actions. Fur-
thermore, they understand that other players’ behavior also depends
14In general, these studies reflect a substantial regularity across very different groups,
except some highly trained ones.
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on their beliefs about others and so on.
As an example, we present some preliminary results of their own re-
sponses. To do this, some monitoring sheets (see appendix) can be
used to illustrate the average behavior of the groups. Since the average
chosen number decreases through successive rounds, students realize
that GT approximately predicts their performance.
c. We now have all the necessary ingredients to ”cook up” the Nash equi-
librium concept. Let x be player i’s forecast of the mean of all numbers
submitted. Player i chooses xi with the objective of minxi∈[0,100] |
xi−px |. All players behave identically. Common knowledge of beliefs,
together with mutual best response, imply that in any equilibrium, we
must have x = px. Hence, the unique equilibrium must be that x = 0,
the number which is equal to p times itself.
Since students have experienced the recursive “dynamics” of the NE,
we explain what the abstract concept implies and how this can be rec-
onciled with the real world. In the theoretical model, we suppose that
everything is instantaneously adjusted; the BCG must be explained as
if it were a slow motion picture: repetition lets individuals reach the
theoretical solution step by step. Perfectly rational agents do not need
this, but nobody -not even economists- is fully rational. This is the
second remarkable point: repetition could be a good substitute for ra-
tionality. In fact, the modern view in game theory is that equilibrium
arises from adaptation, evolution, communication or imitation. Since
these processes take time, equilibration should not occur instantly in
one-shot games.
Nagel (1998), Stahl (1996) and, most recently, Camerer et al. (2003b)
present very precise formal models of limited rationality that accu-
rately describe the experimental results of these games. Specifically,
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Camerer et al. (2003a) develop a non-equilibrium model for one-shot
games with decision rules for players doing different steps of think-
ing15. Their prediction for dominance solvable games will converge to
the Nash equilibrium as a limit result.
Finally, as an anecdote, we mentioned A Beautiful Mind, the movie about
John Nash’s life. The film tries to explain the NE to ordinary people using
an allegorical sequence. In this scene, John is in a pub with some friends
when a group of girls walk in. If all the guys try to pick up only the prettiest
girl, all the girls would leave and all the guys would be out of luck. The
BCG can be seen as a similar symbolic game: individuals have to compete to
outguess the rest of the participants, but without cooperation, costly errors
can occur. Knowing game theory concepts could reduce these costs16.
Results
The experimental BCG was played in three different sessions using two sam-
ples of first-year Business undergraduates (B-1 and B-2) and one sample of
first-year Business+Law undergraduates (B+L). Table 1 shows the distribu-
tion of subjects participating in the experimental sessions by group. Our
entire sample consists of 139 subjects assigned to 6 groups per session (5 in
15The link between thinking steps and the iterated deletion of dominated strategies
lies in the fact that players who are not thinking strategically randomize, while players
doing k steps of thinking accurately predict what lower-level players do and best-respond
accordingly.
16 It is important to remind students about the importance of their intellectual achieve-
ment: John Nash won the Nobel Prize thanks to this simple discovery. See Varian (2002)
for a nice explanation about Nash’s brilliant and beautiful contribution. In contrast to
what viewers of the film might think, it is clearly not a new strategy to pick up girls.
Myerson (1999) gives an interesting historical perspective to this important innovation.
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B+L). All groups played four rounds of the BCG.
[Table 1 about here.]
Although our interest specifically lies in the process of learning the NE,
we have considered it meaningful to show first period behavior. In this way,
we are able to relate our experimental results to the theoretical reasoning
levels shown in Figure 2. Figure 3 shows the relative distribution of first-
round iterated steps. As we can see, the behavior of subjects in session B-1
and session B+L are quite similar, while the subjects in session B-2 seem to
have a higher level of reasoning than the other two17.
[Figure 3 about here.]
At an aggregate level, Table 2 shows the average chosen number and the
standard deviation across sessions and rounds.
[Table 2 about here.]
As can be seen, the mean of the chosen numbers decreases throughout
successive rounds in all cases18. However, we observe that the path to con-
vergence is not identical. Figure 4 illustrates each trend in the experimental
session.
[Figure 4 about here.]
17Camerer et al. (2003a) estimate the average number of thinking steps at 1.61 across
24 one-shot beauty contest games. They find quite low estimates (0− 1) when p > 1 and
high estimates (3− 5) in games where the equilibrium is within the interval.
18Although the initial average observed in our experiment is similar to that of Kocher
and Sutter (2001), our final average is very different! After running 4 rounds as well, their
final averages are around 7, while ours are clearly higher (from 9.7 to 19.1).
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At first sight, sessions B-1 and B+L behave similarly, but the trend in B-2
shows a flatter slope. As our main interest is to study the learning effect, we
analyze the average variation more accurately round after round. We define
speed of convergence as: (µi − µi−1)/µi−1 where µi is the average guessed
number in round i (i = 1, . . . , 4). This speed of convergence is shown in
Table 3.
[Table 3 about here.]
Note that all the sessions share a similar initial speed of convergence close
to 20%. However, this speed varies dramatically within and between groups
from round 2 to 3 and from round 3 to 4 . Thus, the learning effect is clearly
observable in all rounds and sessions.
After this descriptive approximation, we statistically analyze the results
obtained. More specifically, we are interested in testing if students are in-
duced to modify their behavior towards the Nash equilibrium by repeatedly
playing a BCG a set number of times. Therefore, we expect the average num-
ber in a round to be different from the following round and, furthermore, that
the difference between one round and the following round be greater than
zero, that is, that it will decrease. In order to verify this, we formulate the
following null hypothesis:
H0 : µij − µkj = 0, i < k and i, k = 1, ..., 4
and alternative hypothesis:
H1 : µij − µkj > 0, i < k and i, k = 1, ..., 4
where i, k represent two consecutive rounds and j represents the session num-
ber (1 for B-1, 2 for B-2 and 3 for B+L, respectively).
15
The statistical analysis is developed in depth in the appendix. Briefly, we
check if each population follows the normal distribution. If one of them does
not follow the normal distribution, we use a parametric and a non-parametric
test to contrast our null hypothesis. Our main results show that:
• In session B-1 the learning effect is observed in the entire experiment.
• In session B-2 the learning effect is observed in the last two rounds.
• In session B+L the learning effect is also observed in all rounds.
To sum up, these results indicate that this is a powerful tool to aid stu-
dents in reaching the Nash equilibrium.
Variations of the Experiment
This section describes several variations of the classroom experiment pro-
posed in our paper. As stated above, there exist multiple possible variations
of the beauty contest game that could be used as a classroom experiment.
Some of the most important of these are discussed below.
The two-person beauty contest game
This version of the game is interesting because, unlike the general BCG in
which there are more than two players, in a two-person game the player who
picks the lowest number wins (if p < 1). Thus, the subject who plays the
Nash equilibrium strategy (0) always wins. Therefore, 0 is not only a weakly
dominant strategy, but also the best response for all the choices of the other
person. For this reason, this variant is a good example of the attractive power
of the equilibrium point. As Camerer et al. (2003a) point out, this special
16
game can be solved by only one step of weak dominance. In their model,
all players using one or more thinking steps will choose zero. However, it is
important to recall that the most important point of the experiment is to
show students the strength of the equilibrium concept, even for complicated
games.
However, Grosskopf and Nagel (2001) show that usually subjects do not
chose the zero in the one-shot game and then, do not reach the equilib-
rium immediately. Even more, under full information students need some
repetitions to realize that zero is the Nash equilibrium. Then, authors con-
clude saying that “convergence toward equilibrium is driven by imitation and
adaptation rather than self-initiated rational reasoning”.
Nonetheless, an interesting option could be to perform both the n = 2
and n > 2 experiments in the same class. Some groups can play the first
version, while the others play the second one. It would then be interesting to
compare both versions in the post-experimental session and show students
that the NE sometimes fails to describe the reality if the convergence process
is too long (see Grosskopf and Nagel, 2001).
The entire class experiment
If the class is not large enough, an interesting alternative is to perform the
experiment using the whole class as a single group. The main advantage to
this is that no student needs to sit out as a monitor. Also, the individual
effect on the population average would decrease slightly. In contrast, if the
group is too large, the process can become a bit cumbersome for the teacher.
The most straightforward way to run this BCG is for the instructor (or
any ”ad hoc” volunteer) to write the submitted numbers on the board while
another volunteer calculates the mean and p ∗mean. Note that all guessed
17
numbers should be collected beforehand.
Web-based experiments
In his web page at Virginia University19, Charles Holt provides some excellent
internet software for playing the BCG (among many other games). Not only
can students play the BCG on this web site but also check their own results
and performance on line as well as comparing their outcomes with other
previous experiments.
However, it should be noted that running the experiment in this way
requires having a computer room with internet access and banning its use
in the classroom. Excepting this “minor” problem, Veconlab is an amazing
tool for teaching. Another point to take into consideration, in our case, is
the fact that Veconlab is only available in English at this time
Other variations
There are several additional variations on the game. A good idea would be
to run some of these simultaneously with different groups in the same class
in order to compare the different outcomes arising from different rules.
• When p > 1, Nagel (1998) shows that this variation of the game is not
trivial. She considered two cases: (1) under p > 1 and the interval
[0, 100], there are two equilibria: everybody chooses either zero or 100.
The latter is the perfect equilibrium20. (2) For p > 1 and the interval
[100, 200], the only equilibrium is 200; the upper bound of the interval.
19http://www.people.virginia.edu/ cah2k/
20Nevertheless, there are no dominated strategies in this version and thus no process of
iterated elimination of dominated strategies leading to equilibrium.
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The iterated deletion process starts from the lower bound 100p, 100p2
and so on21.
• Using the median instead of the mean, for example, can help to il-
lustrate to our students that the game does not change and the con-
vergence towards the equilibrium is basically the same under different
conditions (see Nagel et al., 1999).
• By using large and small groups, identical results may be found in
the one-shot game, but faster convergence to the equilibrium in larger
groups. Duffy and Nagel (1997) studied the influence of a single player
on aggregated performance. They use three treatments changing the
order statistic from mean to maximum or median for p = 1/2, so the
extreme choices have very different weights.
• Giving students different feedback. When comparing feedback-free
BCG with ‘normal’ BCG we may observe that convergence is slower
when subjects are not informed about the numbers chosen by their
partners. The lack of information constrains subjects’ learning to their
own experience (see Weber, 2003a and Weber, 2003b). In our case,
we gave students very little information (only aggregated data). Given
that one of the goals of the experiment was to show students the attrac-
tive power of the equilibrium, we preferred a low information variant22.
21In this case, the number of eliminations is finite. That is the reason why these games
are called finite threshold games (FT). See also Ho et al. (1998).
22As Weber (2003b) points out, even if you do not give any feedback, convergence will be
achieved, although the pace will be slower. It will take more time to make the calculation,
although the rounds will be faster. It is up to the instructor to choose the desired mix of
information/convergence speed.
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Final Remarks
In this paper we have formulated an interesting classroom experiment: a
repeated version of the Beauty Contest Game. Our experience is that this
sort of game is a good way to introduce the complexity of the equilibrium
concept. Not only does it permits students to see the mechanism in action,
but also to comprehend the difference between a theoretical abstraction and
real world dynamics towards equilibrium.
The BCG is one of those tricky games worth playing: although it is
plainly simple in its formulation and the solution is always obvious ex-post,
you realize the difficulties of outsmarting other people while having a good
time doing it.
The classroom experiment needs some careful preparation to make con-
veniently mixed groups. However, once everything is ready to go, if the
monitors are well trained, rounds should run quite smoothly and increas-
ingly fast. Although for our purposes four rounds are enough, it would be
easy to play as many as ten rounds if necessary. Continuous repetitions
would be very rewarding for students, as this would let most of them reach
the theoretical solution on their own before the post-experimental session.
Once the BCG is done and the post-experimental session is concluded,
it is possible to run other experiments so students realize how game theory
training helps them to solve interesting (and sometimes lucrative) puzzles.
Appendix
Experimental Instruments
All these documents were originally written in Spanish.
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Instructions
You are going to participate in a microeconomic experiment. You have been
randomly assigned to a 6-10 person group. In this game you will have to make
decisions repeatedly in four rounds. Your partners will be the same through-
out the four stages. Moreover, your group has been assigned a monitor that
will oversee the procedure.
The rules of the game in each period are as follows: you should choose
a (integer or decimal) number in the interval [0, 100]. You are allowed to
choose zero and one hundred. Once the monitor has collected your group’s
choices, the winner will be determined. The winning number is the number
closest to 2/3 of the average of all the numbers chosen by your group:
x =
2
3
·
∑n
i=1 xi
n
.
The winner of each round will receive a prize of 0.25 extra points valid towards
the Micro II final exam. If two or more people are equally close to x, the
prize will be split equally among them. A person so lucky as to guess the
right number all four times will get a whole point!
First you must write down the group and code you were given at the top of
the attached sheet. Then in each round, you must select your number. When
everyone has finished, the monitor will collect your responses. Afterwards,
you will be given back your sheet with some additional information: the
average of your group, 2/3 of this average and the winning number. This
procedure will be repeated four times.
If you have any questions, please raise your hand and the instructor will
come to you. You are not allowed to speak during the experiment.
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Monitoring Sheet
Monitor: Group: Session:
Full Name Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4
Subject 1
Subject 2
Subject 3
Subject 4
Subject 5
Subject 6
Subject 7
Subject 8
Subject 9
Subject 10
Average
2/3 of average
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Individual Answer Sheet
Code: Group:
First Round
Group Average:
Your Choice: 2/3 of the average
Winning Number:
Second Round
Group Average:
Your Choice: 2/3 of the average
Winning Number:
Third Round
Group Average:
Your Choice: 2/3 of the average
Winning Number:
Fourth Round
Group Average:
Your Choice: 2/3 of the average
Winning Number:
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Statistical Analysis
Let Xij be the number chosen by a student at round i in session j, where
i = 1, ..., 4 and j = 1, 2, 3. Let Fij(X) be the distribution function associated
to each variable Xij.
First, we verify if each Fij(X) follows a normal distribution with mean
µij and standard deviation σij. To do so, we use the Kolmogorov-Smirnof
goodness-of-fit test. Table 4 shows the results:
[Table 4 about here.]
As we can see, individual choices adjust to a normal distribution except
in the third round of the first session (B-1) of the game.
Using a parametric test for the equality of means between paired rounds,
the results are the following:
[Table 5 about here.]
Observe that it is not possible to apply this test to the third round of the
first session (B-1) because it does not follow a normal distribution.
From the p-values shown in Table 5 we can say that the difference between
successive average choices is statistically positive in all cells except for the first
two rounds in the second session (B-2). In this last case, the null hypothesis
of mean equality is accepted.
In order to include the third round of the first session in the statistical
analysis, we apply the Wilcoxon non-parametric test using the same hypoth-
esis as above. Results are summarized in the following table:
[Table 6 about here.]
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Given these p-values, only the means of the first two rounds in the second
session are equal, while the null hypothesis is rejected for the remainder of
cases.
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1005033.322.214.89.96.60
K = 0
K = 1K = 2K = 3K = 4K = 5K =∞
Figure 1: An example of different reasoning levels
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10066.644.429.619.713.20
R(0)R(1)R(2)R(3)R(4)· · ·
Figure 2: Iterated reasoning of individuals by eliminating dominated strate-
gies
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Figure 3: Relative frequencies in the first round
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Figure 4: Evolution of session averages
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Number of Subjects per group & session
Session B-1 Session B-2 Session B+L
Group 1 10 6 10
Group 2 11 6 8
Group 3 9 6 9
Group 4 9 5 8
Group 5 10 6 10
Group 6 10 6 —
Session Pop. 59 35 45
Table 1: Distribution of group size
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Session B-1 Session B-2 Session B+L
Round Average St. Dev. Average St. Dev. Average St. Dev.
1 38.885 19.348 20.782 17.611 37.067 18.891
2 32.087 14.235 17.060 12.362 29.008 11.554
3 22.660 16.750 13.042 7.318 22.712 11.577
4 14.419 13.360 9.748 7.503 19.142 13.944
Table 2: Average number and standard deviation per round and session
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B-1 B-2 B+L
(µ2 − µ1)/µ1 0.17 0.18 0.22
(µ3 − µ2)/µ2 0.29 0.24 0.22
(µ4 − µ3)/µ3 0.36 0.25 0.16
Table 3: Speed per round and session
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B-1 B-2 B+L
Round Z-statistic p-value Z-statistic p-value Z-statistic p-value
1 1.116 0.165 0.937 0.344 1.135 0.152
2 1.063 0.208 0.713 0.690 0.681 0.742
3 1.579 0.014(*) 0.384 0.998 0.792 0.556
4 1.285 0.074 0.709 0.696 0.867 0.440
(*) significant at 5%
Table 4: Kolmogorov-Smirnof goodness-of-fit results
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B-1 B-2 B+L
t-stat. p-value t-stat. p-value t-stat. p-value
Round 1 vs. 2 2.315 0.012 1.252 0.109 2.951 0.002
Round 2 vs. 3 - - 2.107 0.021 3.148 0.001
Round 3 vs. 4 - - 2.859 0.003 1.758 0.042
Round 2 vs. 4 7.586 0 - - - -
Table 5: Parametric test for mean equality
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B-1 B-2 B+L
Z-stat. p-value Z-stat. p-value Z-stat. p-value
Round 1 vs. 2 -2.378 0.008 -1.077 0.1414 -2.467 0.006
Round 2 vs. 3 -4.612 0 -2.001 0.022 -2.871 0.002
Round 3 vs. 4 -5.225 0 -3.459 0 -3.45 0
Table 6: Wilcoxon non-parametric test for mean equality
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